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ABSTRACT: This Note examines the legal approaches to surrogacy and argues
that the realities of gestational surrogacy in the United States necessitate a
predictable and clear legal approach. In Part 1, this Note surveys the state of
surrogacy and highlights the pressing need for legal certainty. Part I considers
and rejects common arguments against the enforceability of surrogacy
contracts. Using recent examples from California, Part III demonstrates
American courts' increasing comfort with adjudicating reproductive disputes in
a freedom of contract framework, and encourages this judicial approach for
future surrogacy disputes. The Note further argues that it is imperative that
lawyers advising parties to surrogacy contracts consider liquidated damages for
"tragic breaches" of contract. By honoring well-negotiated liquidated damages
provisions, courts can respect the wishes, autonomy, and intentions of the
contracting parties.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an immense literature on the moral status of both the practice of
surrogacy and surrogacy contracts. Surrogacy contracts are "agreements
pursuant to which a woman would, for a fee, agree to bear a child for a man,
woman or couple incapable of having a child of their own."I Much of what is
written falls within two distinct eras. The first, ranging from approximately the
late 1980s to the mid 1990s tracks with the introduction of medicalized assisted
reproductive technologies, such as artificial insemination, which made
traditional surrogacy more available and palatable to the average infertile
couple. With this surge came disputes related to surrogacy-primarily disputes
over parentage. Most famously, the New Jersey courts considered the matter of
Baby M.2 Mary Beth Whitehead, a surrogate, refused to hand over to the Stems
the child she had carried for them.3 While ostensibly a contract dispute, the
case largely focused on parentage and evaluations of appropriate parentage (or
best interests of the child). Accordingly, much of the literature from this era
focuses on questions of parentage: who is the mother, legally and morally? Can
a woman "sell" the baby she carried to term?
The second, ranging from approximately the mid-2000s onward tracks with
the proliferation of the second wave of assisted reproduction, specifically in
vitro fertilization ("IVF"), as well as greater social and legal acceptance of gay
relationships and gay marriage. Here, the nature of the discussions changes. If a
woman is merely a gestational carrier, that is, if the surrogate is inseminated via
IVF, and the implanted embryo is genetically unrelated, does she have the same
1. 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16:22 (4th ed.), Westlaw
Williston on Contracts (database updated May 2015).




claims to parentage as a traditional surrogate? How are courts to interpret laws
that give parentage to the "natural mother" in the event of a custody dispute?
Indeed, both are "natural" insofar as one is genetically related and the other
carried and delivered the child. In the wake of expanded reproductive rights
and greater social and constitutional acceptance of gay relationships, are people
entitled to assisted reproductive technologies to help them "beget a child?"A
Overlaying all of this is a more general discussion of whether surrogacy
contracts are valid and enforceable.
While these are all important questions, they primarily focus on family
structure and parentage. In doing so, they obfuscate the underlying fundamental
questions about the validity of surrogacy contracts, and whether surrogacy
contracts can coherently fit into a freedom of contract framework. The
prevailing discourse frames the surrogacy debate as a polarized issue: either
surrogacy contracts are valid and enforceable, or they are not. The literature
that does address the validity of surrogacy contracts still focuses on issues of
parentage insofar as the examples of broken surrogacy agreements focus on
promises that are broken after the surrogate brings the child to term. As a
result, this literature misses important kinds of broken promises that challenge
existing views.
Three examples highlight the fundamental flaw in focusing on ex post
breaches:
+ Scenario 1: Surrogate Refusal to Terminate
A husband and wife ("the couple") cannot conceive naturally but have
viable eggs and sperm. They decide to engage a gestational surrogate.
The surrogate successfully undergoes IVF with the couple's genetic
embryo. As the pregnancy progresses, the couple decides they want to
terminate the pregnancy. The surrogate refuses to terminate. Prior to
implanting the embryo, the surrogate and the couple agreed that the
surrogate would terminate the pregnancy at the request of the couple,
and her refusal to do so constitutes a breach (assuming the contract is
valid and enforceable) or a broken promise.
4. Scenario 2: Surrogate Unilaterally Terminates
Scenario 2 involves the same basic facts as Scenario 1, but in this case,
the surrogate decides to terminate the pregnancy without the couple's
consent and without notifying them in advance.
4. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." (emphasis
added)).
5. They might decide to terminate the pregnancy for a variety of reasons, including fetal
abnormalities, a change in life circumstances, divorce, etc.
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+ Scenario 3: Surrogate Breaches "Behavioral Terms"
Scenario 3 again involves the same basic facts as Scenario 1, but in
this case, the surrogate fails to follow any "behavioral terms" in the
contract. These "behavioral terms" are provisions that circumscribe the
surrogate's behavior during the pregnancy, and can range from
provisions prohibiting certain activities (e.g. drinking, substance
use/abuse, etc.) to provisions requiring certain activities (e.g. attending
regular doctor's appointments, taking certain prenatal vitamins, etc.).
The surrogate fails to follow these provisions, carries the fetus to term,
and the resulting child is born with mild to severe disabilities.
These three scenarios present cases of what I call "tragic breaches." They
present difficult questions of ethics and of law. Similar to Guido Calabresi and
Philip Bobbitt's "tragic choices," 6 these tragic breaches require the courts to
make determinations of law and equity that necessarily will result in tragedy for
one or both parties because of the nature of the breach.
The first tragic breach scenario is the only scenario touched on in the
literature but is little discussed and inadequately addressed. Indeed, this
scenario necessarily involves questions of parentage and financial
responsibility for the child, and existing frameworks of family law can
plausibly resolve it. The second scenario, however, is more challenging. What
would an appropriate remedy be in this scenario? Obviously the equitable
remedy of specific performance is unavailable (and, in the event that the
surrogate notified the couple of her intentions prior to terminating the
pregnancy, likely unconstitutional). Often surrogates are not in a financial
position to return the costs of assisted reproduction because of the exorbitantly
high costs of these procedures.8
This leaves the courts in the uncomfortable and undesirable position of
placing monetary value on potential human life. Indeed, that is why many
courts and legislatures have declared surrogacy contracts unenforceable, or in
some cases, criminal. But this is a cowardly and prophylactic reaction to an
unavoidable challenge.
In this Note, I briefly survey the history of and legal approaches to
surrogacy, and argue that the realities of gestational surrogacy in the United
States necessitate a predictable and clear legal approach. I examine and reject
two common objections to surrogacy contracts: that these contracts are
unconscionable, and that they violate public policy. Instead, I argue that
unconscionability is ill-suited to the surrogacy contract because of both the
changing power differentials and the diverse demographics of women who
6. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
7. See infra Part VI.
8. See infra Part I.
9. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2010).
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serve as surrogates. Specifically, I show that surrogacy contracts ought to be
enforced, and the court should apply a freedom of contract framework to
disputes about surrogacy contracts as it is freedom enhancing-not freedom
limiting-in this context. Finally, I argue that surrogacy contracts should
contain, and courts ought to honor, liquidated damages provisions in the event
of tragic breaches.
This Note focuses solely on gestational surrogacy, and it characterizes
gestational surrogacy as a service. Indeed, the payment structure of surrogacy
contracts supports this characterization. Many surrogacy contracts specify
compensation is to be paid in installments over the course of the pregnancy. o
The difference between traditional and gestational surrogacy is discussed in
more depth below. Accordingly, the Note does not (and need not) address
arguments around market inalienability of human body parts, including
gametes." Notably, construing sexual or reproductive services or abilities is not
new legal reasoning; indeed, loss of consortium claims place value in sexual
services or capabilities. Despite the paper's exclusive focus on gestational
surrogacy contracts, very few courts have specifically addressed the issue, so it
is useful to look to judicial reasoning in other areas of assisted reproduction.
For example, examining the judicial reasoning in disputes involving traditional
surrogacy, as well as cases involving egg donation, provides illuminating
indications of how courts may frame issues and balance competing interests in
this area. Though gestational surrogacy presents unique concerns, some
considerations are common to both: multiple parties with directly conflicting
interests, potential "mismatch" between the genetic parent and the intended
parent, and more broadly, the issue of contracting around human reproduction.
This paper only addresses surrogacy contracts formed and occurring within
the United States, though it does use Canada as an illustrative example in Part
VI. Power differentials are substantially different in the context of cross-border
surrogacy.12 The economic and racial disparities between the surrogate and the
intended parents are greater and often these surrogacy arrangements operate
under the shadow of the law or in a legal vacuum entirely. These circumstances
allow brokerage agencies to systematize the exploitation and facilitate
"reproductive tourism" between Western couples seeking a surrogate and a
surrogate in another country (typically India, Nepal, and Thailand). 3 The
10. Angie Godwin McEwen, Note, So You're Having Another Woman's Baby: Economics and
Exploitation in Gestational Surrogacy, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 291 (1999).
11. For a discussion of the market inalienability of body parts, see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). Radin's basic argument is that all rights, attributes, and
things intrinsically unique to the human person ought not be commodified, and market-inalienability is
the proper way to ensure body parts are not commodified. See also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (Arabian, J., concurring).
12. See generally Amrita Banerjee, Race and a Transnational Reproductive Caste System: Indian
Transnational Surrogacy, 29 HYPATIA 113 (2014).
13. These arrangements are known by a variety of terms, including "rent-a-womb" arrangements
and reproductive tourism. One recent example is Nepal, where foreign couples that had engaged
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exploitation concerns in these contexts are fundamentally different and
currently cannot be adequately addressed in a freedom of contract framework.
As Angie Godwin McEwen notes, "The absence of an international policy
regulating transnational surrogacy arrangements, combined with varying
policies in individual countries, creates the possibility of inequity and
overreaching in surrogacy."l4
Part I provides background information about the history of surrogacy
techniques and early judicial approaches to surrogacy disputes in the United
States. This history is crucial to contextualizing and understanding the
entrenched beliefs about surrogacy and objections to surrogacy contracts,
despite the radically different medical technology used in surrogacy procedures
today. Part II rebuts the common argument that surrogacy contracts are
unconscionable. While the power differentials at the negotiation stage tend
toward the intended parents, these power differentials reverse in a predictable
way: the surrogate is in a superior position for the period between conception
and birth. This reversal of power differentials throughout the surrogacy process
creates a contractual context that is not unconscionable, but instead is freedom
enhancing for both parties to the contract. Part III surveys recent judicial
decisions that address and adjudicate disputes in other areas of assisted
reproduction from a freedom of contract framework. Two examples in
California courts illustrate a shift in some courts' willingness to adjudicate such
disputes and suggest that some courts may be more amenable to the approach
proposed by this paper than previously believed. Indeed, Part IV argues that
courts should respect freedom of contract in the surrogacy context and ought to
extend this theoretical framework to disputes arising out of surrogacy contracts.
This section focuses on the legal uncertainties that currently exist and argues
that legal certainty is needed and that freedom of contract is the best and most
practical way to achieve this certainty. Part V addresses the limitations to my
argument, including the constitutional concern about whether and to what
extent certain fundamental rights are involved in surrogacy disputes. These are
deep questions that warrant attention, but are outside the general scope of this
paper, which is limited to surrogacy in the contractual context. While it is true
that to a certain extent it is a fiction to separate the contract from the
Constitution, it is unlikely that these constitutional questions will receive much
traction outside of the Academy-it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
have an opportunity to provide guidance on these issues for a variety of
reasons, including, but not limited to, the rarity with which surrogacy disputes
surrogates were stuck in Nepal after the surrogate gave birth to the child. The government ultimately
decided to issue exit documents to these couples and the babies that were the result of surrogacy services
arranged prior to the recent ban. See 54 Couples Leave Country with Surrogate Babies, KATHMANDU
PosT (Nov. 24, 2015), http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2015-11-24/54-couples-leave-country-
with-surrogate-babies.html.
14. McEwen, supra note 10, at 286.
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are litigated. The constitutional questions are interesting and important, but it is
crucial to adopt a realistic approach to surrogacy given the widespread use of
surrogates, the legal uncertainty of these contracts, and the deeply personal
implications of tragic breaches.
1. THE REALITY OF SURROGACY IN THE UNITED STATES
The current state of surrogacy technology and contractual arrangements is
markedly different from the surrogacy discussed at the outset, but the current
state of surrogacy has been informed by this history. Most significantly,
medical advances have made gestational surrogacy involving three parents the
norm, and this greatly affects the power and family dynamics of surrogacy.
Understanding the history of surrogacy techniques and the enforcement of
surrogacy contracts is critical to understanding the common objections to
enforcing these contracts, insofar as the history contextualizes and explains the
development and entrenchment of these deeply held beliefs.
A. History and Evolution of Surrogacy Techniques
Surrogacy is the oldest assisted reproduction technique; barren women
have been using surrogates since Biblical times. Genesis first tells the story of
Sarah, Abraham, and Hagar:
Now Sarai Abram's wife bare him no children: and she had [a]
handmaid, an Egyptian, whose name was Hagar. And Sarai said unto
Abram, Behold now, the Lord hath restrained me from bearing: I pray
thee, go in unto my maid; it may be that I may obtain children by her.
And Abram hearkened to the voice of Sarai.15
Similarly, when Rachel and Leah were unable to bear children, they also
requested that their husbands "obtain children" by their maids.16 These maids
had no agency in these traditional surrogacy arrangements.1
Surrogacy in biblical times was limited to traditional surrogacy. In
traditional surrogacy arrangements, the surrogate provides her own egg and is
inseminated by "donor" sperm. The insemination can take many forms; in
biblical times, surrogacy likely required sexual intercourse, but it has since
become more medicalized. Because the surrogate in a traditional surrogacy
arrangement provides her own egg, the surrogate mother and not the intentional
15. Genesis 16:1-2 (King James).
16. See Genesis 30:1-4, 9-10 (King James).
17. McEwen, supra note 10, at 275.
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mother has the genetic link to the resulting child. Forms of traditional
surrogacy have survived into the modern era.
Early modem surrogacy arrangements had similar power dynamics to
biblical surrogacy. As Carla Spivack notes, "Arguably, all African American
slave women before the Civil War were surrogate mothers for their owners,
gestating and giving birth to children who would not belong to them but
become the property of their masters."'8 After the Civil War, traditional
surrogacy declined until advances in reproductive technologies in the 1970s
allowed for easier surrogate arrangements. Medicalized artificial insemination
made traditional surrogacy simpler, and in 1978 in vitro fertilization ("IVF")
paved the way for gestational surrogacy.19 LVF first resulted in a child in the
20United States in 1981.
Gestational surrogacy, in contrast to traditional surrogacy, eliminates the
genetic connection between the gestational carrier (surrogate) and the resulting
child. Just as courts began to gain confidence in their resolution of parentage
disputes, the biological connection between surrogate and child was severed.
As a result of this separation of components, some jurisdictions have more
favorable policies towards gestational surrogacy contracts leading many
fertility clinics to prefer gestational surrogacy as the standard form.21
Furthermore, this differentiated supply (i.e., women willing to sell their eggs
and women willing to serve as a gestational carrier) allowed the markets for
both to grow. Some women are interested in only providing either the egg or
22
acting as the gestational carrier, but not both. As of 2013, these new medical
advances "have made the science of making babies into a $3 billion-a-year
industry." 23
B. The Current State ofSurrogacy Contracts in the United States
Given the size of the baby-making business, it is perhaps surprising that
there is no uniform regulation. There was a largely unsuccessful attempt at
uniform regulation of surrogacy contracts across the United States that began in
earnest in 1998. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws ("NCCUSL") promulgated the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act ("USCACA"). USCACA provided two alternative provisions
18. Carla Spivack, The Law ofSurrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J. CoMP. L. 97,
97 (2010). For a more robust discussion of surrogacy and race, see Anita L. Allen, The Black Surrogate
Mother, 8 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 17, 17 (1999).
19. See Bart C. Fauser & Robert G. Edwards, The Early Days oflYF, 11 HUMAN REPROD. UPDATE
437 (2005).
20. Id.
21. Spivack, supra note 18, at 99.
22. Caitlin Conklin, Simply Inconsistent: Surrogacy Laws in the United States and the Pressing




regarding the validity of surrogacy contracts because the commissioners were
unable to reach consensus. Met with little acceptance, the NCCUSL replaced it
in 2000 with the Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA"). The UPA took the position
that surrogacy contracts are valid and enforceable if first approved by a court,
and allowed for compensation to the surrogate.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") Section of Family Law's
Committee on Reproductive and Genetic Technology has also promulgated a
model act addressing surrogacy contracts. The Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology offers two approaches to surrogacy contracts, but
both assume valid contracts. Notably, as of 2010, no state has adopted the
Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology.
As a result, there is a patchwork of different approaches to surrogacy
contracts across the United States.24 Some states prohibit surrogacy contracts
outright, regardless of compensation, and impose civil and/or criminal penalties
on the parties to the contract. 25 Other states take a "hands off' approach: the
state declines to ban surrogacy contracts by statute, but allows the courts to
nullify these contracts as contrary to public policy. 26 Applying another statutory
structure still, some states allow surrogacy, but prohibit consideration for
surrogacy-though reimbursement of expenses is usually permissible. 27 Six
states-Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, and
Washington-refuse to enforce surrogacy contracts involving compensation. 28
Illinois is unique insofar as it permits a fee for service.29 Given that there is no
unifying statutory or judicial approach to surrogacy contracts, there is certainly
no uniformity in approaches to adjudicate disputes arising from these contracts.
C. Early Judicial Approaches to Surrogacy Disputes
When courts were first faced with surrogacy contract disputes, their
outcomes were difficult to predict because the disputes were issues of first
impression at a magnitude not usually seen: surrogacy contracts do not fit
neatly into standard contract law regimes, nor do they fit cleanly into family
24. Radhika Rao's categorical framework is useful to make sense of this mosaic. Rao groups state's
approaches into four categories: prohibition, inaction, status regulation, and contractual ordering. See
Radhika Rao, Surrogacy Law in the United States: The Outcome of Ambivalence, in SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 23 (Rachel Cook et al. eds., 2003).
25. Id.; see, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402 (West 2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West
2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 (West
2016); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121-24 (McKinney 2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210-60
(West 2016).
26. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
27. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.16 (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (West 2016).
28. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 2016);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21, 200 (West 2016).
29. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
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law. Two early cases, In re Baby M(1988) and Johnson v. Calvert (1993), with
similar facts and divergent outcomes largely set the stage for future decisions.
In re Baby M first brought attention to the legal difficulties with traditional
surrogacy agreements. 3 0 In 1985, William Stern, Mary Beth Whitehead, and
Richard Whitehead entered into a contract, which provided that Whitehead
would be inseminated with William Stem's sperm, bring the child to term, and
relinquish parental rights to the Stems, after which Elizabeth Stem (William
Stem's wife) would officially adopt the child.3 ' The artificial insemination was
successful, and Whitehead gave birth to the baby girl in late March of 1986.
Three days later, she gave the baby to the Stems. Whitehead then had second
thoughts, and begged the Stems to take the child back. Four months later, the
Stems regained custody of the baby girl by having the baby forcibly removed
from the Whitehead's control. The Stems subsequently brought a complaint
seeking enforcement of the surrogacy contract. The trial court held the
surrogacy contract was valid and enforceable. On appeal, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the contract was invalid because it conflicted with the
state laws and was against public policy insofar as it amounted to "baby-
selling" in contravention to the adoption laws of New Jersey.
A second case that brought questions of gestational surrogacy contracts to
the fore was the case of Johnson v. Calvert.32 The surrogate, Anna Johnson,
contracted with Mark and Crispina Calvert to be implanted with an embryo
comprised of the Calvert's sperm and egg, bring the fetus to term, and
relinquish the child to the Calverts in exchange for $10,000 and a $200,000 life
insurance policy. 33 After conception, the "relations deteriorated between the
two sides."34 The surrogate, Anna Johnson, threatened to keep the child unless
the Calverts tendered the final payment early. In return, the Calverts sought a
declaration that they were the parents of the child. The trial court ruled in the
Calvert's favor. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California looked to the
intent of the parties in signing the contract, finding that "when the two means
[gestation and genetics] do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to
procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child
that she intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under California
law."35 Here, the Court found that the commissioning couple-the Calverts-
was the legal parents of the child. Despite the fact that the court did not find
surrogacy contracts to violate public policy, it also did not endorse them as
California policy.
30. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
31. Id.
32. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 778.
35. Id. at 782.
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Predictably, the wildly divergent outcomes of these cases have led people
who wish to engage a surrogate to forum shop among surrogate-friendly
states. 6 Florida and California in particular have become hubs for the
surrogacy market. Despite the shady legal status of surrogacy contracts in
most jurisdictions, the desire to have biological children is a strong one and the
surrogacy market is alive and well. Individuals or agencies that broker
surrogacy arrangements are common and have existed since the beginning of
the modem surrogacy era (roughly understood as beginning in the 1970s with
advances in reproductive technologies).
Recent estimates put the cost of surrogacy, excluding medical costs for IVF
and pregnancy, at $60,000 to $80,000.38 "A first time surrogate typically
receives compensation of $25,000 for a single fetus, and $28,000+ for carrying
more than one child."39 The outstanding $35,000 to $55,000 represents the cost
of legal fees, surrogate background checks, and health insurance.40
Noel Keane, a Michigan attorney, brokered the first surrogacy agreement
in the United States.4 1 He arranged the births of over six hundred children
42(including the contract that led to the Baby M dispute). After Keane,
surrogacy brokerage firms popped up across the country in jurisdictions that are
surrogacy friendly as well as those that are not. For example, the New York
area is a hub for fertility brokerage services despite the fact that New York has
strict surrogacy laws. In New York, all surrogacy contracts (including altruistic
surrogacy arrangements) are void and unenforceable.4 3 Parties to the contract
are subject to a civil penalty up to $500, and parties who helped to arrange the
contract may face a penalty of $10,000 and must disgorge any fees received in
the brokering process." A second violation constitutes a felony.45
Most reported cases addressing surrogacy sidestep the fundamental issue of
enforceability of the contract, and instead address secondary questions
including: whether the surrogacy arrangement violates "baby-selling" statutes;
whether these statutes are constitutional; which party to the contract is entitled
to custody of the future child; whether the gestational carrier (birth mother) or
the genetic mother is the legal mother of the child; the effect of the contract on
the right of the child to inherit.46 In general, most courts have not directly
declared whether surrogacy contracts are valid contracts, preferring to punt this
question to the legislatures and to the Academy.
36. Conklin, supra note 22, at 72 (citations omitted).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., id. at 87.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 70.
42. Id. at 71.
43. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2010).
44. Id § 123(2)(a)-(b).
45. Id.
46. 7 WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 16:22.
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II. SURROGACY CONTRACTS ARE NOT UNCONSCIONABLE OR
CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
A. Unconscionability Concerns Are Unfounded
A frequent refrain in the literature is that surrogacy contracts should not be
enforced because they are per se unconscionable insofar as they amount to
"baby-selling" or "reproductive slavery." 47 These moralistic unconscionability
arguments are weak at best as they misunderstand the doctrine of
unconscionability. Unconscionability is a broad and poorly defined concept.
Indeed, the UCC does not define "unconscionable" but instead "gives the
courts broad latitude in determining, either on their own initiative or based on
an assertion by a party, that a particular contract or clause was unconscionable
as a matter of law at the time the agreement was made."AS
One of the oldest iterations of unconscionable agreements holds that an
unconscionable agreement is one "such as no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would
accept on the other."49 This definition has led to two paths of unconscionability
jurisprudence, with one focusing on inherent fairness of the outcome, and
another focusing on inherent fairness of the process.
Courts have endorsed the outcome fairness view of unconscionability as
recently as 2012, characterizing unconscionability as "directed against one-
sided, oppressive and unfairly surprising contracts, and not against the
consequences per se of uneven bargaining power or even a simple old-
47. See, e.g., George Annas, Surrogate Parenthood: Surrogacy = Baby Selling, 73 ABA JOURNAL
38 (1987). The broad idea that an individual cannot voluntarily contract oneself to slavery finds root in
the work of John Stuart Mill and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In On Slavery, Mill explains how slavery
defeats the very justification underlying freedom of contract:
[B]y selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it
beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the
justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in
a position which has no longer the presumption in its favour, that would be afforded by his
voluntarily remaining in it. . . . It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS, 99-100 (Mark Philp &
Frederick Rosen eds., Oxford University Press 2015) (1859). Rousseau discusses the absurdity of
contracts for slavery in Book I of Social Contract: "To say that a man gives himself gratuitously, is to
say what is absurb and inconceivable; . . . Finally, it is an empty and contradictory convention that sets
up, on the one side, absolute authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience." JEAN JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT & DISCOURSES (G.D.H. Cole, trans., J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 1920)
(1792), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/46333/46333-h/46333-h.htm#CHAPTER- IV. These arguments
about slavery broadly have been adopted by critics of surrogacy who argue that it is similarly
inconceivable and contradictory for a woman to contract away her reproductive liberty by making
binding decisions about her future reproductive choices at an earlier point in time. Proponents of this
view argue that this constrains the very liberty that freedom of contract aims to protect; in agreeing to
carry a child for another person, the woman constrains her future liberty to exercise her reproductive
choices, such as having an abortion or keeping the child.
48. 8 WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 18:8.
49. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen,
[1751] 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100).
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fashioned bad bargain."50 For example, in a series of 2013 cases, West Virginia
courts further endorsed this view, holding that a contract is unconscionable
when it is one-sided or grossly imbalanced, and stating that a court may be
justified in refusing to enforce such a contract as written.5 1
In contract law, the also-prevalent procedural understanding of
unconscionability doctrine is that the doctrine "allows courts to deny
enforcement of a contract because of procedural abuses arising out of the
contract's formation." 5 2 An oft-quoted articulation of this view is that the
doctrine of unconscionability is grounded in the equitable principle "that courts
will not enforce transactions in which the relative positions of the parties are
such that one has unconscionably taken advantage of the necessities of the
other." 53 On this view, unconscionability should be defined solely by reference
to external factors that may prevent parties from making free choices.54
Today most courts typically consider both aspects when determining
whether a contract or clause is unconscionable. The "absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party."55  While unconscionability
technically only applies to the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), "courts
have also recognized a broadly applicable common law public policy against
agreements involving an unconscionable disparity in bargaining positions."
The commodification argument-a common objection to surrogacy
contracts-does not fit into the doctrine of unconscionability, despite appealing
to it for support. The commodification argument, broadly, contends that by
contracting around reproductive services, society impermissibly treats women
and children as commodities.57 Proponents of this argument appeal to
something akin to human dignity or an inviolable and sacred aspect of
reproduction,58 whereas the doctrine of unconscionability focuses on power
differentials, bargaining power, and fairness. Though individuals may perceive
commercial surrogacy as violating human dignity, this alone is an insufficient
reason to prohibit the practice. Indeed, many individuals are uncomfortable
50. Schnuerle v. Insight Communications, Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 575 (Ky. 2012).
51. New v. GameStop, Inc., 753 S.E.2d 62, 74 (W. Va. 2013); Pingley v. Perfection Plus Turbo-
Dry, LLC, 746 S.E.2d 544, 550 (W. Va. 2013).
52. Markwed Excavating, Inc. v. City of Mandan, 791 N.W.2d 22, 30 (N.D. 2010) (quoting Strand
v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 693 N.W.2d 918, 921 (N.D. 2005)).
53. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
54. Philip Bridwell, Comment, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2003).
55. 8 WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 18:9 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
56. Id. at§ 18:5.
57. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71
(1990); Radin, supra note 11.
58. See RUTH MACKLIN, SURROGATES AND OTHER MOTHERS: THE DEBATES OVER ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION 27-48 (1994).
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with abortion and assisted dying for similar reasons, 59 yet our pluralistic society
recognizes that these are decisions for individuals to make.60 Further, the
realities of surrogacy today are such that these arrangements are occurring in an
environment of legal uncertainty, which puts all parties to the contract at legal
risk.
In related areas of law arguments from unconscionability have been
rejected. For example, premarital agreements are also contracts about family
structure, yet these do not face the same critiques despite power differentials
existing between spouses.61 As Deborah Forman notes, "[t]he Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act, adopted by many states, provides that a premarital
agreement is not unconscionable unless it was involuntary or would leave an
ex-spouse on public assistance if it were enforced." 62 It is clear, then, that
another common argument against surrogacy-the coercion argument-also
does not fit tightly into unconscionability doctrine.
Unconscionability is not a sufficient justification for blanket
unenforceability of surrogacy contracts. Surrogacy contracts are not inherently
unconscionable; both parties negotiate the terms of the contract and, given the
biological realities of pregnancy, are aware of the likely outcomes. Indeed, the
potential breaches discussed in the introduction are examples of "surprising" or
"extraordinary" outcomes, but these are not outcomes of the terms of the
contract-as breaches, they are by definition outside the contract.
Further, proponents of blanket unconscionability for surrogacy contracts
fail to recognize that the power differentials inherent in surrogacy contract
change over time, and so enforceability protects both parties to the contract.63
At the outset of negotiation, the parents may be in the power position. The
intended parents can "shop" between potential surrogates and set a price they
59. Thomas L. Cook, Gestational Surrogacy and Live Organ Donation: A Contrast, in THE ETHICS
OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 251 (Steven J. Jensen ed., 2011).
60. Abortion and assisted dying are individual decisions and not contracts, so the human dignity
concerns manifest as a slightly different legal argument. There, the arugment is that because these
decisions violate human dignity, the state should prohibit individuals from exercising their freedom of
choice and criminalize or limit access to these services. In the case of surrogacy contracts, the argument
is that the contracts violate human dignity and thus courts should find these contracts unconscionable. In
both cases, however, the argument in the abstract is that there is an affirmative action that violates
human dignity, and the state, in the way most available to it, should prohibit individuals from making
these decisions for themselves. However, our pluralistic society either has already concluded that these
are personal choices that ought to be left up to individuals (in the case of abortion) or is moving toward
that view (in the case of assisted suicide). Because there are reasonable disagreements about morality,
that one group of people finds an act to violate human dignity is an insufficient reason for denying a
second group of people from acting.
61. Some forms of marital contracts do, however, face being voided as against public policy (for
example, a contract that would change some essential incident of the marital relationship in a way
detrimental to the public interest of the institution of marriage). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 190 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Promise Detrimental to the Marital Relationship").
62. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A Model for
Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378,436 (2013).
63. See Dominique Ladomato, Protecting Traditional Surrogacy Contracting Through Fee
Payment Regulation, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 245, 269 (2012).
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deem appropriate, offering more or less depending on a multitude of factors
including their desperation for a child and the "desirability" of the surrogate,
among others. This power structure is commonly the focus of discussions of
unfair bargaining and thus per se unconscionability. This argument focuses on
exploitation; given that money can be a strong motivator to act when one might
otherwise not, many vulnerable and poor women of childbearing age will be
induced to act as a surrogate as a result of this motivation. The underlying
concern is that the power structures inherent in the intended parent-surrogate
negotiation process allow the intended parents to exploit the surrogate by
offering enough money to compel the surrogate to sign a contract that is clearly
not in her best interest.64
The general structure of this exploitation argument is common across
bioethics literature, and is most prominent in the context of organ donation.
This exploitation argument might hold sway in the surrogacy context if power
differentials are only considered ex ante. However, the surrogacy context is
fundamentally different, and so it is misguided to focus solely on the
contractual negotiations.
Generally, courts look to only to the power differentials that exist at the
contract negotiation stage in assessing the contract because of a concern that
looking at other points of the contract may allow one party to extort the other
party at a later point in time after negotiations are complete. That is, courts are
concerned that looking to post-contractual power differentials will destabilize
contracts, undermine freedom of contract, and allow a party to claim more than
what both parties agreed to during the negotiaton stage. Accordingly, courts
look to the power differentials that exist when the contract was formed to
determine whether the contract in question was exploitative.6 5 In the surrogacy
context, though, the change in power differentials is significant and always
present such that the power differentials that exist at the time of formation are
not determinative of whether the contract is exploitative.
Surrogacy contracts are unique in that the aforementioned "flip" in power
differentials is always present in surrogacy contracts, and accordingly is
foreseeable for every contract. Foreseeability of this switch in the power
position mitigates against the general concern of courts that one party may be
extorting the other party after negotiations are complete. Both parties entering
into the contract know that their power position will flip, and therefore account
64. The argument in the context of organ donation is that vulnerable and/or poor people will act
against their own best interests and sell their organs for a short-term monetary gain. See, e.g., Kate
Greasley, A Legal Market in Organs: The Problem Of Exploitation, 40 J. MED. ETHICS 51 (2012).
65. See generally Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability:
An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067 (2006) (describing factors courts use
when determining whether a contract is unconscionable); Max Helveston & Michael Jacobs, The
Incoherent Role of Bargaining Power in Contract Law, 49 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 1017 (2014)
(surveying case law and academic literature discussing bargaining power and its role in contractual
analysis).
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for this future change when negotiating the terms of the contract. Looking only
to the power differentials as they exist at the contract formation stage when
reviewing a contract for unconscionability misses this unqiue feature of
surrogacy contracts.
Surrogacy itself is at least a nine-month process after the initial negotiation,
and the changing power structures must be considered as well. Once the
intended parents and surrogate are deep into the negotiation process, the
surrogate can hold an extreme position of power. First, if the intended parent is
turning to surrogacy as a last resort, the surrogate can demand more
66
consideration for her services. Not only does the surrogate have legal rights,
but once she starts to perform, she is carrying the future child. This creates a
situation in which the power positions have flipped: the surrogate now holds
most of the power. At an extreme, the intended parents may be victims of
extortion, or, more likely, will feel a personal compulsion to acquiesce to the
surrogate's every whim for fear of surrogate breach.
Given that these potential inequities affect and are foreseeable to both
parties to the contract, the traditional concern of exploitation is less convincing
than it might be in non-surrogacy contexts. Exploitation of surrogates is, of
course, a valid concern-and in some cases the surrogate may indeed be
exploited-but this concern is insufficient to justify blanket unenforceability of
surrogacy contracts.67 Instead, surrogates and intended parents should be
allowed to negotiate the terms of their unique contract. This deliberative
process allows each party to consider the potential risk and benefit of the
bargain. A per se prohibition on enforcing surrogacy contracts is paternalistic
and fails to respond to exploitation concerns because any exploitation is
necessarily fact- and situation-specific. On this understanding, surrogacy
contracts are freedom enhancing, and not freedom limiting.6 8 Specifically,
surrogacy contracts are freedom enhancing insofar as they enable the parties to
negotiate the terms by which they exercise their reproductive choices,
freedoms, and goals. Honoring surrogacy contracts enhances the reproductive
freedom of woman who wish to serve as surrogates, and allows these women to
negotiate the terms by which they choose to use their reproductive capabilities
to serve as a surrogate.
66. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (in which the surrogate demanded the
final payment before schedule and threatened not to relinquish her rights to the Calverts if they failed to
comply).
67. The feminist literature on surrogacy implicitly recognizes this changing power differential,
which is, in part, why there is no uniform feminist view of surrogacy. See, e.g., SUSAN MARKENS,
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 160-62 (2007) (discussing the
disagreement among California women's rights group responses to proposed surrogacy legislation in the
1980s).




Furthermore, per se unconscionability fails to recognize differences among
the women who serve as surrogates. Blanket unenforceability is paternalistic
insofar as it is based on assumptions about potential surrogates, specifically that
they are poor, vulnerable, and unable to make informed decisions in their best
interest.
In reality, the motivations and demographics of surrogates are more
diverse. "Contrary to popular beliefs about money as a prime motive, surrogate
mothers overwhelmingly report that they choose to bear children for others
primarily out of altruistic concerns."6 9 Other motivations to act as a surrogate
include an enjoyment of pregnancy, a sense of achievement, and of course,
financial gains. 70 Additionally "most surrogate mothers are in their twenties or
thirties, White, Christian, married, and have children of their own .. .incomes
are most often modest (as opposed to low) and they are from working class
backgrounds."7 ' Collecting data in the surrogacy context is challenging for both
practical and ethical reasons and so the sample sizes of these studies tend to be
small. As a result, it is difficult to determine with certainty what proportion of
surrogates fit the aforementioned demographic. Despite this limitation, it is
clear that all surrogates cannot be reduced to the generalization of poor,
vulnerable, uneducated, ethnic minorities.
B. Surrogacy Contracts Do Not Violate "Public Policy"
A tangential but recurrent argument made by both surrogacy scholars and
the courts is that surrogacy contracts are against public policy and thus void.
The basic argument is that public policy may categorically prohibit certain
types of agreements, despite the fact that all parties have agreed to the terms of
the agreement. It is in the interest of public policy to uphold and respect human
dignity, so contracts for goods and services that degrade human dignity are
legally void.72 Prostitution, or contracts for sexual services, is a famous
example of such a transaction facing this criticism. 73 Proponents of this view in
69. Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An Overview of
Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy Contracts, 61 J. Soc. ISSUES 21, 30 (2005) (internal citations
omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 31.
72. McEwen, supra note 10, at 291.
73. Melissa Farley, a research and clinical psychologist, is a leading advocate of the view that
prostitution is by definition a form of exploitation and abuse of women, regardless of the context,
structure of the prostitution arrangement, or existence of violence. In an affidavit from the leading
Canadian case on the constitutionality on three criminal prohibitions on prostitution, Farley states that
whether legal or illegal, "[p]rostitution is better understood as domestic violence than as a job." Farley
Aff. 1 16, Apr. 2008, Bedford v. Att'y Gen. of Canada, 2010 ONSC 5712 (Can.) (07-CV-329807PDI).
Farley, Catharine MacKinnon, and Wendy Shalit argue for this view in an episode of
IntelligenceSquared titled "It's Wrong to Pay for Sex." MacKinnon analogizes prostitution to slavery,
noting that:
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the surrogacy context specifically argue that surrogacy contracts are against
public policy because under adoption law, "payment for consent to adoption of
a child [is] illegal" and so surrogacy should be illegal as well.74
This reasoning was adopted early on by the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in the Matter of Baby M. The court held that surrogacy contracts are void
because they "[violate] the policy of this State" because the harms and evils
that justify the prohibition of payments for adoptions also exist within the
75
context of surrogacy arrangements. The court found that the surrogacy
contract amounted to a "sale of a child, or, at the very least, the sale of a
mother's right to her child, the only mitigating factor being that one of the
purchasers is the father."7 6
This analogy between surrogacy and adoption falls apart when surrogacy
contracts are seen as service contracts because the surrogate is compensated for
the services of carrying the child and not for relinquishing parental rights.
Indeed, the court in Johnson v. Calvert adopted a similar logic, finding that
surrogacy and adoption are fundamentally different, despite the fact that both
surrogacy and adoption have the potential to allow infertile couples have a
family.77
III. COURTS HAVE BEGUN TO ADDRESS ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IN A
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT FRAMEWORK
Since the infamous Baby M and Johnson v. Calvert cases, courts and
regulators have been hesitant to touch assisted reproduction, effectively
resulting in a legal vacuum around the issue, with some exceptions. Two recent
In prostitution, women have sex with men they would otherwise never have sex with. The
money thus acts as a form of force, not as a measure of consent. It acts like physical force
does in rape. . . . And then she is stigmatized and deprived for dignity by society, and
criminalized by the legal system. . . . And what he is buying is not only that chunk of her
humanity called self-respect.
It's Wrong to Pay for Sex, INTELLIGENCE SQUARED U.S 29-30 (Apr. 21, 2009),
http://intelligencesquaredus.org/images/debates/past/transcripts/sex-debate.pdf (statement of Catharine
MacKinnon in transcript of podcast debate). See also Melissa Farley, "Bad for the Body, Bad for the
Heart": Prostitution Harms Women Even if Legalized or Decriminalized, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1087, 1087 (2004); Melissa Farley, Isin Baral, Merab Kiremire & Ufuk Sezgin, Prostitution in
Five Countries: Violence and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 8 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 405, 405
(1998). Note also that there are many critics of this view who argue that the degradation of human
dignity in the prostitution context is divorceable from the transaction of sex, but tied instead to the
trafficking and societal stigma that surrounds prostitution today. Sheila Jeffreys, Prostitution,
Trafficking and Feminism: An Update on the Debate, 32 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 316 (2009).
74. Eric A. Gordon, The Aftermath of Johnson v. Calvert: Surrogacy Law Reflects a More Liberal
View ofReproductive Technology, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 191, 198 (1993).
75. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1247 (1988).
76. Id. at 1248.
77. Gordon, supra note 74, at 198.
78. See, e.g., Malcolm L. Goggin et al., The Comparative Policy Design Perspective,
inCOMPARATIVE BIOMEDICAL POLICY: GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES I (Ivar
Bleiklie et al. eds, 2004).
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cases, both out of California (one in state court and one in a federal district
court), suggest a shift in some courts' willingness to adjudicate disputes around
assisted reproduction. Notably, both courts are most comfortable addressing
these issues in the framework of freedom of contract.
The Northern District of California's decision in Kamakahi v. American
Society for Reproductive Medicine is one example of the changing view of the
courts. 79 In 2000, the Defendant, American Society for Reproductive Medicine
("ASRM") created rules "setting forth the maximum compensation its members
should pay for egg donor services . . . and Defendant the Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology ("SART") adopted Maximum Price Rules."80
Like the surrogacy market, the egg donor market is largely self-regulated.
There are no federal laws or regulations governing economic compensation for
egg donation; only two states- Louisiana ' and Indiana 82-have laws
governing egg donor compensation. Accordingly, a majority of American
fertility clinics follow the ASRM guidelines. The rationale behind the
guidelines is to avoid creating a structure that incentivizes vulnerable (read:
young and poor) women to donate their eggs without considering the risks
associated with the procedure. 84
In reality, however, the ASRM guidelines strengthen the power of fertility
clinics and surrogacy matching services. The guidelines, which establish
payment ceilings for egg donors, allow these clinics and services to keep a
larger proportion of the money brought in by the women seeking the fertility
treatment. Payment to egg donors is meant to compensate the extreme physical
and psychological toll of the process: hormone injections to stimulate egg
production, frequent medical tests and doctor visits to monitor the eggs, and
minor surgery to retrieve or "harvest" the eggs.
In 2011, lead plaintiffs-women who donated eggs-filed a class action
complaint alleging antitrust violations, specifically alleging a horizontal price-
fixing agreement among purchasers of human egg donor services. The
79. Kamakahi v. Am. Socy for Reprod. Med., 305 F.R.D. 164 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
80. Complaint at 2, Kamakahi, 305 F.R.D. 164 (No. I 1-cv-01781).
81. LA REV. STAT. § 9:122 (West 2011) ("The sale of a human ovum, fertilized human ovum, or
human embryo is expressly prohibited.").
82. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-5-3(a)-(c) (West 2015) ("A person who knowingly or intentionally
purchases or sells a human ovum . . . commits unlawful transfer of a human organism, a Level 5
felony.... This section does not apply to . .. [t]he transfer to or receipt by either a woman donor of an
ovum or a qualified third party of an amount for: (A) earnings lost due to absence from employment; (B)
travel expenses' (C) hospital expenses; (D) medical expenses; and (E) recovery time in an amount not to
exceed four thousand dollars.").
83. Editorial, Paying for Egg Donations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/opinion/paying-for-egg-donations.html.
84. American Society for Reproductive Medicine Ethics Committee, Financial Compensation of
Oocyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305 (2007),
https://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRMContent/News-andPublications/EthicsCommittee-Repor
tsandStatements/financial-incentives.pdf.
85. See Payingfor Egg Donations, supra note 83.
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plaintiffs allege that the $5,000 and $10,000 limits constitute an unlawful
horizontal price-fixing agreement, resulting in artificially low compensation for
egg donors. 86 The complaint withstood a motion to dismiss. The judge granted
the plaintiffs' motion for class certification but limited the class to women who
donated eggs since April 2007 at any clinic that was, at the time of donation, a
member of SART or followed the price rules set by the society and the
ASRM. 8 7 The decision to certify the class demonstrates that some courts are
willing to touch the broader issue of contracting around assisted reproduction,
and perhaps more importantly, are comfortable considering questions of
assisted reproduction in a freedom of contract framework.
A second case came out of the Superior Court of the State of California in
and for the county of San Francisco. The dispute in this case is more akin to the
examples of contractual disputes described in the introduction: a couple,
Findley and Lee, froze five embryos and later disagreed on the fate of these
embryos. After a divorce and a bout with cancer, Lee-the ex-wife-sought the
right to use these embryos for a viable pregnancy (as they were her only chance
of having biological children), despite a contractual provision that in the event
of divorce, the embryos would be thawed and discarded.
In this case, the Superior Court held "that the Consent & Agreement Lee
and Findley signed prior to their divorce controls and the intent of the parties at
the time, as evidenced by that document, must be given conclusive effect." 89
The court emphasized that freedom of contract was the proper framework to
adjudicate this dispute, despite the wrenching nature of such disputes:
The policy best suited to ensuring that these disputes are resolving in a
clear-eyed manner-unswayed by the turmoil, emotion, and
accusations that attend to contested proceedings in family court-is to
give effect to the intentions of the parties at the time of the decision at
issue. If there is one thing which, more than another, public policy
requires it is that men and women of full age and competent
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contract, and that their
contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred,
and shall be enforced by courts of justice.90
86. Complaint at 10-12, Kamakahi v. Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., 305 F.R.D. 164 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (No. l l-cv-01781).
87. Kamakahi, 305 F.R.D. at 196.
88. Tentative Decision and Proposed Statement of Decision at 3, Findley v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., No. FDI-13-780539 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2015).
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 4 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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IV. COURTS SHOULD RESPECT FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN THE
SURROGACY CONTEXT
There is an unacceptable level of uncertainty as to the enforceability of
surrogacy contracts in certain breach scenarios, even in states with
comparatively high levels of legal certainty around surrogacy contracts. At the
extreme, in a state with no regulation and limited or no precedent, this absence
of law is no assurance that the contract will be upheld in any meaningful way in
the event of a dispute. Further, the patchwork nature across states combined
with the resulting forum shopping creates additional legal concerns of a more
procedural nature.9 1
To a certain extent, the approach to breaches resulting in parentage and
custody disputes is fairly settled. After Johnson v. Calvert, California looks to
the intention of the parties at the outset when there is a dispute over custody
and parentage. Other states have followed this lead, and the ABA Model Act
adopts a similar approach.9 2
Despite this, legal uncertainty exists even in states with more robust
surrogacy regimes. For example, the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act
("GSA) 93 sets forth certain requirements necessary for a valid surrogacy
contract: a written contract, two adult witnesses, and separate legal
representation for the intended parents and the surrogate. The GSA provides
ample guidance in custody disputes, but is still insufficient in the tragic breach
situations discussed in the introduction.
The GSA requirements for a valid surrogacy contract represent the bare
minimum; they do not ensure that the resulting contract addresses the tragic
breaches outlined in the introduction. A written contract negotiated with
separate legal represention for the intended parents and the surrogate, and
witnessed by two adult witnesses does not ensure that the contract contemplates
the appropriate result when the surrogate refuses to terminate the pregnancy at
the intended parents request, when the surrogate unilaterally terminates without
the consent of the intended parents, or when the surrogate breaches behavioral
terms and the resulting child is born with serious physical or behavioral
problems. Though contracts that comply with the GSA may contemplate the
potential for these tragic breaches, the requirements of the GSA do not ensure
that the resulting contracts cover these tragic breaches.
91. For an anecdotal discussion of the procedural concerns accompanying surrogacy agreements
that straddle state lines, see Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A Constitutional Law Professor's
Musings on Circumventing Washington State's Criminal Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89
WASH. L. REv. 1235 (2014).
92. See Am. Bar Ass'n, American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology §§ 602-03 (2008), http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.
93. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25 (West 2016).
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These legal uncertainties and patchwork laws are not just theoretical
curiosities; the vastly divergent legal treatment of surrogacy can result in
harrowing cross-border ordeals. Though this dispute was never litigated, the
breakdown of a surrogacy agreement between Crystal Kelley, a surrogate, and
the intended parents illustrates the absurd consequences of this legal
uncertainty. In 2011, Crystal Kelley of Vernon, Connecticut met the couple for
whom she would serve as a gestational surrogate. 94 The intended parents had
two remaining embryos comprised of the husband's sperm and the egg of an
anonymous donor, and hoped to have another child through a surrogate before
the embryos "expired." 9 5 After meeting with the intended parents and their
children, Kelley contacted her surrogacy agent to start the surrogacy process.96
Kelley reports that the original contract included a provision that allowed the
intended parents to ask for an abortion at any time for any reason. 97 Kelley was
uncomfortable with this, and the parties compromised on a clause that allowed
the intended parents to request an abortion only if a 3D ultrasound detected
fetal abnormalities. 98
At the start, the surrogacy arrangement went smoothly: On October 8, 2011
the doctors implanted the embryos, Kelley became pregnant quickly, and the
relationship between Kelley and the intended mother was friendly and
supportive.99 At a follow-up ultrasound, the parties learned that the fetus had a
possible heart defect; further ultrasounds showed additional birth defects such
as a cleft lip and likely stomach problems.1 o The intended parents discussed
their wishes, and contacted Kelley letting her know that they did not want to
continue with the pregnancy. Kelley was uncomfortable with terminating the
pregnancy without further medical testing; her own daughter had had heart
problems, and recovered well from surgery, and she wanted to ensure the fetus
had a similar chance.10 1 The parents offered Kelley an additional $10,000 to
abort the fetus (in addition to the compensation already bargained for), and
Kelley refused.102 At this point, the congenial relationship broke down: after
this, all communication between Kelley and the intended parents was
conducted through a lawyer. 03
94. Caitlin Keating. Surrogate Mom Gives Birth to Baby Girl with Serious Birth Defects Despite






99. Id.; see also Lindsay McCane, Crystal Kelley: Surrogate Gives Birth to Baby with Birth Defects
after Parents Order Her to Abort, INQUlsITR (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.inquisitr.com/2852037/crystal-
kelley-surrogate-gives-birth-to-baby-with-birth-defects-after-parents-order-her-to-abort.
100. McCane, supra note 99.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Keating, supra note 94.
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Kelley decided to continue the pregnancy, but under Connecticut state law
she would have no parental rights and the child would most likely enter the
foster system.' The patchwork nature of state surrogacy laws led Kelley to
move to Michigan, because she believed the Michigan law to be more
favorable to her interest of putting the child up for adoption.'0 5 The intended
father relinquished his paternal rights, but asked that he and his wife keep in
touch with the adoptive family about the child.106 Though the case of Crystal
Kelley and Baby S was never adjudicated in court, it presents an example of
both a tragic breach, and the ways in which the current uncertainties can
exarcerbate the fallout. Greater legal certainty is important, and one major way
to increase certainty is for courts to honor well-written and well-negotiated
surrogacy contracts. The specifics of a well-written and well-negotiated
surrogacy contract, and how they avoid tragic breaches, are discussed below.
A. The Freedom of Contract Framework is Freedom Enhancing in
Surrogacy Contexts
Freedom of contract is based on the principle of autonomy fundamental to
our society. Courts must act with caution when limiting autonomy, for
"conscionable freedom of contract has historically been recognized under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution." 07 Contracts in general are freedom enhancing insofar as they
allow parties to contract around the default rules of a given jurisdiction to
achieve mutually desirable outcomes. The freedom to change one's mind
comes at the expense of another's freedom to rely on promised outcome or
option. Without contract, the parties would be subject to the default rules of a
jurisdiction or a court determination that might not provide an outcome the
parties both desire. Both of these results (default rules and court
determinations) "circumscribe, rather than enhance, the parties' freedom. . .
.Without this assurance, some individuals might choose not to participate and,
hence, enjoy less procreative freedom than they would have otherwise. Others
104. Id.; see also Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 698 (2011) (holding that Connecticut law
"allows an intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational surrogacy agreement to become a parent
without first adopting the children").
105. Keating, supra note 94; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.861 (1988),
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(sixsvxn3bs4yjtwek I fc2au2))/mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectNam
e=mcl-722-861.
106. Keating, supra note 94.
107. Austin Caster, Don't Split the Baby: How the U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and Unnecessary
Litigation and Promote Equality By Emulating the British Surrogacy Law Regime, 10 CONN. PUB. INT.
L.J. 477, 507 (2011); see also id. ("Though the Act merely purported to provide safe working
conditions, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right
to make contracts, and that unnecessary or arbitrary interference with such contracts is unconstitutional.
Later decisions limited Lochner's absolute right to freedom of contract where the terms were
unconscionable or the contract became tools to the detriment of fellow man, but Lochner still has not
been explicitly overturned.").
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will proceed but end up subject to an outcome at odds with their expectations or
desires."'
08
In an area as deeply personal as reproductive choice, having the freedom to
make decisions and rely on other people is of paramount importance. Decisions
to act as or hire a surrogate have sweeping implications ranging from health
risks to astronomic financial costs. The current legal uncertainty around
surrogacy contracts places the parties to these agreements in a freedom-limiting
limbo; the parties may be subject to the default rules or court determinations
contrary to both parties' interests and desires. Recognizing freedom of contract
for surrogacy agreements serves only to enhance the freedom of all parties to
these contracts.
B. Potential Remedies for Tragic Breaches
Assuming a court applies a freedom of contract framework to surrogacy
contracts and finds the contracts valid and enforceable, the very difficult task of
determining appropriate remedies for tragic breaches remains. Some have
suggested that the area of assisted reproduction is an ideal area for specific
performance. 109 As Deborah Forman notes:
The very factor that might lead us instinctively to reject the option of
specific performance-that the embryos are unique to both parties-in
fact provides the basis for it. Specific performance is an equitable
remedy that is typically available when monetary damages cannot
adequately compensate the non-breaching party, such as when unique
property is at issue.
Notably, Forman focuses on disputes over embryos, and not tragic breaches of
surrogacy contracts.
Though both embryo disputes and surrogacy disputes both implicate
reproductive technologies, the nature of the disputed matter is very different.
First, disagreements involving embryos do not-at the time of the dispute-
involve a human life, whereas surrogacy disputes can involve children.'1 '
Second, gestational surrogacy arrangements involve more parties than typical
108. Forman, supra note 62, at433.
109. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81
VA. L. REV. 2305 (1995).
110. Forman, supra note 62, at439-40.
Il l. See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (surrogate sought to keep the child
resulting from the surrogacy agreement and refused to relinquish rights to the intended parents); In re
F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634 (Wis. 2013) (biological father filed a motion seeking enforcement of a
surrogacy agreement, specifically seeking primary placement of the resulting child with the biological
father); In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005) (gestational surrogate filed a parentage action
against the biological father seeking custody of the resulting triplet and child support; the court
determined that the gestational surrogate was the legal mother and gave her joint custody).
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disputes over embryo disposition. Usually there are at least three parties (the
intended parents and the surrogate) but there can be more (an egg donor and/or
sperm donor separate from the intended parents or surrogate).
Specific performance-though likely preferable to the non-breaching
party-is unavailable because courts are unlikely to compel people to terminate
a pregnancy or continue a pregnancy against their wishes. In the event that the
surrogate refuses to terminate the pregnancy at the parents' wishes, a court
would likely seek an appropriate alternative to specific performance.
It is apparent that these tragic breaches render traditional contractual
remedies unavailable or unappealing and messy for a court to consider.
Honoring liquidated damages in surrogacy contracts is an alternative approach
to damages that removes responsibility from the courts to explicitly determine
the monetary value of human life or the service of pregnancy, as well as make
determinations about whether a fetus is a human being.
C. Liquidated Damages
Liquidated damages clauses allow the parties to determine damages, in
advance, "for breach of the contract in situations where it would be difficult to
ascertain or prove actual damages."" 2 Liquidated damages are perfectly suited
to the surrogacy context; courts are hesitant to unilaterally ascertain or
determine damages for tragic breaches, and the deeply personal nature of these
contractual relationships can result in wildly different damage to the party in
each breach. Currently,
American case law, greatly influenced by UCC and the Restatements,
has formulated two conditions which must hold for the stipulated
damages to be enforceable: (a) The stipulated amount must be
reasonable (i.e. not grossly disproportionate) in light of the harm
anticipated by the parties or the actual harm caused by the breach. . . .
(b) It is difficult or impossible to measure-and thus prove-the
presumable loss (due to subjective valuation, uncertainty, difficulty of
producing proof of damages, or any other measurement problems).
It is imperative for lawyers representing clients in surrogacy agreements to
include negotiations of liquidated damages provisions for specific breach
scenarios. Parties ought to negotiate a clause providing for compensation in the
case of a breach or of defective performance. This liquidated damages
provision can be a formula, a fee schedule, required mediation or arbitration, or
any other method to determine damages.
112. Forman, supra note I10, at 442.
113. Aristides N. Hatzis, Having the Cake and Eating It Too: Efficient Penalty Clauses in Common
and Civil Contract Law, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 381, 385-86 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
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Negotiations of liquidated damages provisions in surrogacy contracts are
and ought to be fact and context specific; they should reflect the individual
interests and values of the parties to the contracts. However, there are some
topics that ought to be considered when approaching the negotiation of
liquidated damages provisions. A lawyer advising a party to a surrogacy
negotiation should ensure that their client-whether the client is the intended
parent or the surrogate-as seriously considered their view on issues such as
abortion in the case of selective reduction or genetic defects, among others, for
example. Armed with this information, a lawyer can better advise their client
on the specific terms of the contract, as well as guide the client's thinking about
appropriate liquidated damages in the event of a breach.
For example, if the intended parents are strongly averse to raising a child
with genetic defects, and the surrogate is strongly averse to abortion in the case
of genetic defects, the two parties can approach the negotiations armed with
this important information. It may be that both parties feel the mismatch and
potential for a breach are too great to continue with the negotiations, or, if the
parties are more risk tolerant, they can negotiate liquidated damages in such a
way that adequately compensates for a potential breach. Experienced surrogacy
lawyers can guide their clients through these difficult personal and bioethical
questions and help the client assess the value of a breach to them. What these
provisions would look like specifically depends on the specific factual context
of the parties and the strength of their views, among other things, and thus
cannot be laid out in great detail. The independent value of this deliberation is
further discussed in Part V below.
Courts should enforce fairly negotiated liquidated damages provisions,
despite the American discomfort with this type of provision.1 4 This discomfort
is likely a fear of introducing punitive damages "through the back door." In
contrast, in civil law jurisdictions, liquidated damages are readily enforced, as
long as they are not obviously extravagant. 115
Liquidated damages clauses are subject to judicial scrutiny. Generally,
American courts use either a two- or three-prong test to determine whether a
clause is compensatory or punitive. On the basic two-prong test, particular
provisions are valid and enforceable where: "[1] the actual damages resulting
from a breach are difficult or impossible to ascertain, and [2] the damages
agreed upon has a reasonable relationship to probable losses."6 In
jurisdictions that employ the three-prong test, the court also looks to the
intention of the parties when crafting the provisions.' '7
114. Id. at 383.
115. Id.




The difficulty in distinguishing compensatory damages from punitive
damages is acute in the surrogacy context. The absence of clear remedies for
tragic breaches is the motivator for liquidated damages in the first place, and
this difficulty combined with the exorbitant cost of surrogacy may result in
large monetary damages. There is a risk of circular reasoning here: appropriate
liquidated damages are determined by reference to "standard" damages. Since
there are no established damages for these breaches, liquidated damages will
either be presumed punitive, or enforced without scrutiny.
Though a challenge, it is not insurmountable. The "fundamental basis of
the distinction between a penalty and a stipulated damages provision is
generally accepted, and usually said to involve, at least in the classical view,
the intent of the parties in agreeing to the provision."" 8 In a fairly negotiated
surrogacy contract with well-defined liquidated damages provisions, the intent
of the parties is easily discemable, and the damages serve a clearly
compensatory purpose. In the surrogacy context stipulated damages are a more
accurate estimation of loss. "The parties know better than anyone else their
subjective valuations of goods and performances and their stipulations serve
their idiosyncratic values."' 9
Returning to the facts of the Kelley scenario discussed above, which is
strikingly similar to the first example of a tragic breach, it is clear that there
was a breakdown between the parties as to the value of what was at stake for
both parties. When the intended parents offered the gestational surrogate an
additional $10,000 if she were to abort, they were either guessing at the
surrogate's likely valuation of aborting the fetus, or making a statement about
the value they placed on the breach, or both. Had the parties discussed the
liquidated damages for a breach resulting from this sort of disagreement, the
communication breakdown, and potentially the dispute in the first place, could
have been avoided. In that scenario, Kelley was uncomfortable with the initial
abortion provision, and the compromise provision left in turned out to be
insufficient as well. If the parties had negotiated not just the provision itself,
but the damages in the event of a breach of this provision, all parties would
have gone in informed, and there would have been a process to follow in the
event of a disagreement.
D. This Approach Allows Courts to Avoid Wading into Uncomfortable
Territory
Courts are generally loathe to enforce specific performance in service
contracts. These arguments are even more compelling in the surrogacy context.
Surrogacy is much more intimate "service work" than the service work
118. Id.
119. Hatzis, supra note 113, at 390 (citations omitted).
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contemplated in the aforementioned cases. This discomfort is one potential
reason that the courts have, with some exceptions, avoided engaging in
surrogacy disputes.
Enforcing fairly negotiated liquidated damages provisions helps in three
ways. First, enforcement facilitates a more accurate calculation of risks by
eliminating uncertainty.120 Second, it helps parties plan future surrogacy
contracts.121 Third, it reduces transaction costs in the event of disputes
(particularly litigation costs).122 This third benefit should not be overlooked:
surrogacy is an expensive undertaking for all parties, and any decrease in
overall cost is beneficial.
V. EXANTE DISCUSSION AMONG PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT OF
"TRAGIC BREACHES" AVOIDS BREACHES
One important feature of liquidated damages provisions is the related
requirement to discuss tragic breaches and corresponding valuation of the loss
with all parties to the contract. This discussion leads to a better understanding
of the realities of the contract. When parties must seriously consider the
possible breaches and available remedies (if any), they will likely be more
discerning about whom they contract with. The resulting fully executed
contracts are likely to be among trusting parties who have every intention of
carrying out their part of the contract, reducing the risk of tragic breaches in the
first place.
The success of this counterintuitive approach to appropriate remedies for
breaches of surrogacy contracts is most apparent in Canada. Surrogacy is
federally regulated in Canada under the Assisted Human Reproduction Act
("AHRA"). 123 The AHRA prohibits compensated surrogacy countrywide, but
allows each province to determine whether altruistic surrogacy is
permissible.124 Section 6 of the AlHRA reads in relevant part:
[N]o person shall: pay consideration to a female person to be a
surrogate mother, offer to pay such consideration or advertise that it
will be paid; accept consideration for arranging the services of the
surrogate mother, offer to make such an arrangement for consideration
or advertise the arranging of such services. . . . [these prohibitions] do
not affect the validity under provincial law of any agreement under
which a person agrees to be a surrogate mother.
120. Id. at 391.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c 2 [hereinafter AHRA].
124. AHRA s. 6(1)-6(5).
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Altruistic surrogacy permits the intended parents to reimburse a surrogate's
expenses. Accordingly, altruistic surrogacy is permissible in the majority of
Canadian provinces and territories.1 2 5
Despite the federal prohibition on compensated surrogacy, surrogacy
contracts are abundant in jurisdictions that permit altruistic surrogacy. These
contracts include provisions about custody of the child and the plan for a
declaration of parentage; appropriate expenses to be reimbursed and a fee
schedule; permissible and prohibited behavior during pregnancy; access to
otherwise-confidential health care information; arbitration, mediation, and
liquidated damages.1 2 6 The proliferation of surrogacy contracts (and dedicated
"fertility lawyers") in Canada is an interesting phenomenon because the legal
status of the contracts at the heart of this niche is unclear. In Ontario, for
example, it is clear that the surrogacy relationship is legal, but the legal status
of the surrogacy contracts is undetermined.127
This legal uncertainty incentivizes lawyers to comprehensively discuss
potential breaches because there is no guarantee that a court would adjudicate a
dispute on the contract or even favorably to the client. As a result, initial
meetings with clients can be over ninety minutes, and often discuss all
contingencies of pursuing a surrogacy relationship and appropriate remedies.1 28
Another unusual feature of surrogacy agreements in Ontario is the insistence by
both fertility clinics and lawyers that the surrogate, her partner, and the
intended parents to undergo a psychological assessment before entering into a
contract.129 Indeed, many fertility clinics have agreements with social workers
or other therapists who specialize in fertility broadly.130 Here, the legal
certainty about the relationship but not the contract creates an environment
focused on preempting tragic breaches-and thus far seems to have been
successful.
125. For example, both compensated and altruistic surrogacy contracts are unenforceable under
Quebec law. See Civil Code of Quebec, art 541 (Can.) ("Any agreement whereby a woman undertakes
to procreate or carry a child for another person is absolutely null."). For a general discussion of the
history of surrogacy law in Canada, see generally Frangoise Baylis, Jocelyn Downie & Dave Snow,
Fake it Till You Make It: Policymaking and Assisted Human Reproduction in Canada, 36 J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNAECOLOGY CAN. 510 (2014); Frangoise Baylis & Jocelyn Downie, The Tale ofAssisted Human
Reproduction Canada: A Tragedy in Five Acts, 25 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 183 (2013); and Juliet
Guichon, Ian Mitchell & Christopher Doig, Assisted Human Reproduction in Common Law Canada
After the Supreme Court of Canada Reference: Moving Beyond Regulation by Colleges of Physicians
and Surgeons, 25 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 315 (2013).
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VI. LIMITATIONS
A. Many Surrogates Will Be Judgment Proof
It is unusual for wealthy women to act as surrogates, and accordingly there
are concerns that the surrogate will be judgment proof-even with liquidated
damage provisions negotiated ex ante. Ideally, a well-negotiated contract will
address this concern in one of two ways. First, the surrogate and intended
parents can have an honest conversation when negotiating the liquidated
damages provision about what amount would be feasible. Second, the contract
might stipulate that in the event of a breach or pending breach the parties to the
contract must go to arbitration or mediation. This second option is common in
Canadian surrogacy contracts where the validity and enforceability of monetary
liquidated damages provisions is unclear.
B. Is Surrogacy a Fundamental Right? The Constitutional Paradox
Any discussion of surrogacy contracts exists concurrently with discussions
of constitutional rights implicated by the surrogacy process. Is there a
fundamental right to "bear and beget children"? Is there a fundamental right to
assisted reproduction generally? A right to hire a surrogate? Pay an egg donor?
Is there a right to publicly funded IVF? How does the established (but
constantly challenged) fundamental right to an abortion weigh against any
fundamental right to "bear and beget children"? Though a multitude of
academic articles address these (and tangential) questions, there is no
conclusive jurisprudence on this point. While an in-depth analysis of these
difficult questions of constitutional law and constitutional interpretation are
outside the scope of this paper, it is important to flag briefly these competing
arguments.
The potential breach scenarios explained in the introduction implicate an
established substantive due process fundamental right to an abortionl31 as well
as the potential fundamental right to "bear or beget a child.,'1 32 These rights run
up against one another most clearly in the event of a surrogate's unilateral
breach by terminating the pregnancy. Clearly, the surrogate has an established
right to an abortion. As such, specific performance is not an available remedy
for this type of breach. 133
However, in the event that a court finds the language of Eisenstadt v. Baird
compelling, thus establishing a fundamental right to procreate, this right to an
abortion runs up against another fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth
131. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
132. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S 438, 453 (1972).
133. This remedy is undesirable even in the absence of a fundamental right to an abortion.
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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It is unclear how a court would balance
these two fundamental rights against one another, but it is highly unlikely that
specific performance would be an available remedy even in this scenario. For
the moment, this clash of fundamental rights is purely theoretical: The United
States Supreme Court has not ruled on the potential right to procreate hinted at
in Eisenstadt. Notably, the courts that have addressed disputes around assisted
reproduction have avoided the constitutional questions, and indeed, oftentimes
the parties do not raise constitutional issues at all.
An additional question remains under the equal protection clause: Given
that men are allowed to contract their reproductive capabilities (sperm
donation), do restrictions on women contracting their reproductive capabilities
(either egg donation or surrogacy) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution? This is an important legal project-but one that is
outside the scope of this Note.
CONCLUSION
In Part 1, 1 surveyed the realities of surrogacy in the United States, and
showed that there is a pressing need for legal certainty around surrogacy
contracts. In Part II, I considered the use of the common arguments against the
enforceability of surrogacy contracts and found these arguments were not up to
the task. In Part III, I showed that American courts are becoming increasingly
comfortable with analyzing surrogacy contracts in a freedom of contract
framework. In light of this, I argue that the courts ought to respect freedom of
contract in this context. More specifically, I argue that it is imperative that
surrogacy or fertility lawyers consider liquidated damages for tragic breaches,
and that courts ought to honor these clauses. Given the legal uncertainty around
surrogacy contracts, and the very real implications this uncertainty has on
already fraught and tragic disagreements, it is imperative that courts adopt a
freedom of contract framework to the field of surrogacy. Widespread adoption,
alongside a recognition of liquidated damages provisions can help avoid and
mitigate tragic breaches, like the Crystal Kelley example discussed above. By
conceptualizing surrogacy contracts as service contracts, and ensuring judicial
scrutiny of seemingly unreasonable liquidated damages, courts can respect the
wishes, autonomy, and intentions of the contracting parties, while avoiding
wading into difficult territory.
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